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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Edwards v. Arizona IS ALIVE BUT
NOT WELL IN NORTH CAROLINA-State v. Franklin, 308
N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983).
"[T]he blood of an accused is not the only hallmark of a con-
stitutional inquisition."-Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206
(1960).
INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement officers are required to inform individuals
held for interrogation1 that, among other things,2 they have the
right to an attorney's presence during interrogation.$ The Supreme
Court in Miranda v. Arizona4 held that the individual's constitu-
tional right against self incrimination requires such advisement.'
As might be expected, the Court, in Miranda, did not foresee every
situation where an individual might be deprived of his constitu-
tional rights due to government action.6 Therefore, the Court sub-
sequently interpreted the "right to counsel" portion of the Mi-
randa decision as a per se prohibition against interrogation once
1. "Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be
clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer." Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
2. "Other things" refers to the substance of what has come to be known as
the Miranda warning. See 384 U.S. at 478-79.
3. Id.
4. The constitutional basis for the Miranda decision is the fifth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States. 384 U.S. at 478. U.S. Const. amend. V
provides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." The Supreme Court has held that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is applicable to the states as well as to the federal gov-
ernment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
5. "In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately
and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully
honored." 384 U.S. at 467.
6. For example: "What does 'interrogation' mean?" See e.g., Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (discussed infra, see text accompanying notes 36-50);
"When does an individual validly waive his Miranda rights?" See e.g., Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (discussed infra, see text accompanying notes 51-
71).
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the individual has invoked this right.7 "[A]n accused ...having
expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel, is not
subject to further interrogation by the authorities ...unless the
accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or con-
versations with the police." Therefore, in order to hold evidence
obtained from one in custody who has invoked his "right to coun-
sel" admissible, a court must first determine that the person in
custody initiated the exchange which led to the discovery of such
evidence. This is the rule of Edwards v. Arizona.9
On July 7, 1983, the Supreme Court of North Carolina decided
the case of State v. Franklin.0 The majority acknowledged the
rule of Edwards but held that the defendant had not invoked his
right to counsel prior to questioning about the murder for which he
was subsequently convicted.1" In addition, the majority found that
Franklin stated that he did not wish to confer with counsel.12 By
focusing on Franklin's confession, the majority's opinion begs the
real question present in State v. Franklin." The real question is
whether the officers taking Franklin's confession acted in violation
of the Edwards rule and therefore in violation of Franklin's consti-
tutional rights. While Franklin had not invoked his right to coun-
7. Oregon v. Bradshaw, -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 2830 (1983), see infra, text accom-
panying notes 98-101. Specifically, Justice Marshall's dissent:
In his opinion concurring in judgment, Justice Powell suggests that there
is confusion as to whether Edwards announced a a per se rule. In my
view, Edwards unambiguously established such a rule. In any event, no
such confusion on this point can remain after today's decision for eight
Justices manifestly agree that Edwards did create a per se rule. The plu-
rality explicitly refers to the "prophylactic rule" of Edwards . . . . The
rule is simply stated: unless the accused himself initiates further commu-
nication with the police, a valid waiver of the right to counsel cannot be
established. If an accused has himself initiated further communication
with the police, it is still necessary to establish as a separate matter the
existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver under Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The only dispute between the plurality and the
dissent in this case concerns the meaning of "initiation" for the purposes
of the Edwards' per se rule.
-U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. at 2840, n.2 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
8. 451 U.S. 477, 484-85.
9. Id.
10. 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983).
11. Id. at 686, 304 S.E.2d at 582; See also State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 308
S.E.2d 317 (1983) (The court acknowledged Edwards' applicability).
12. 308 N.C. at 686, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
13. Id. at 699, 304 S.E.2d at 589 (Exum, J. dissenting).
[Vol. 7:51
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sel with respect to the Michelle Moody murder, he had invoked his
right to counsel with respect to the Nealy Smith and Amanda Ray
murders."' Franklin was questioned concerning the Smith and Ray
murders; his confession to the Moody murder was a direct result of
this questioning - which he had not initiated. 5
The purpose of this note is to analyze the North Carolina Su-
preme Court's decision in State v. Franklin, in light of the United
States Supreme Court's Edwards rule, to show how the North Car-
olina court deviated from the rule and failed to exclude from trial
evidence obtained in violation of defendant's constitutionally pro-
tected rights.
THE CASE
In January 1981, Joseph Ralph Franklin was charged in Meck-
lenburg County with indecent exposure."6 Lyle Yurko, Assistant
Public Defender for Mecklenburg County, was appointed to re-
present Franklin in this matter. During his representation of
Franklin, 8 Yurko was approached by the Charlotte Police and in-
formed that Franklin was a suspect in the murders of Nealy Smith
and Amanda Ray.' 9 The Charlotte Police wished to question
Franklin about these murders. After discussing this matter with
his supervisor, Yurko was appointed to represent Franklin."0
14. Id. at 685-86, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
15. Id. at 700-01, 304 S.E.2d at 590 (Exum, J. dissenting).
16. Record at 18, Franklin (Order on Motion to Suppress).
17. 308 N.C. at 685, 304 S.E.2d at 581.
18. Record at 19, Franklin (Order on Motion to Suppress).
19. 308 N.C. at 685, 304 S.E.2d at 581.
20. Id. "Presumably pursuant to G.S. § 7A-452(a), Mr. Yurko undertook to
represent defendant with respect to police efforts to question defendant concern-
ing these matters." Id. Special note should be made of Justice Exum's dissent:
Whether or not Mr. Yurko had statutory authority to represent defen-
dant to the limited extent he did in the Smith and Ray cases is not a
relevant question in the instant case. As the trial court stated at the sup-
pression hearing, the evidence is uncontradicted in writing the Police had
been notified, whatever the legalities of the appointment, that defendant
invoked his right to remain silent with regard to the Ray and Smith
cases, and no interrogation as to those matters were to be carried on by
any law enforcement agency in Mecklenburg without the presence of de-
fendant's counsel.
308 N.C. at 697-98, n.2, 304 S.E.2d at 589, n.2 (Exum, J. dissenting).
The Appellant's brief points out that the trial court held that "Officer Styron
was chargeable with this knowledge [that Franklin had invoked his right to coun-
sel]." Brief for Appellant at 10, n.8, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983).
19841
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Franklin acknowledged that he had previously been questioned
about the Smith and Ray murders and that he did not wish to be
questioned again unless counsel was present.2 1 Yurko notified the
District Attorney of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District of Frank-
lin's desire not to be questioned without the presence of counsel. 22
On October 9, 1981, Franklin was in custody in the Mecklen-
burg County Jail. Detective J.F. Styron, of the Charlotte Police
Department, paid a visit to Franklin to discuss one of the cases
Officer Styron was working on-the Smith and Ray murders." The
Public Defender's Office was not contacted.2 4 The result of the in-
terview was a signed waiver of rights 'form and a confession by
Franklin that he murdered Michelle Moody. 5
In a voir dire hearing on the motion to suppress the confes-
sion, the court found as a matter of law that Franklin fully under-
stood his Miranda rights, that he "freely, knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily waived each. .. " right, and denied the motion to
suppress.2 Subsequently, Franklin was convicted of first degree
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that an attorney, not represent-
ing a defendant, cannot invoke that defendant's right to counsel. State v.
Bauguss, 310 N.C. 259, 311 S.E.2d 248 (1984).
21. 308 N.C. at 695, 304 S.E.2d at 587 (Exum, J. dissenting).
22. A copy of the letter was also sent to the Chief of the Mecklenburg County
Police Department and to the Chief of the Charlotte Police Department. Justice
Exum notes in his dissent:
In a cover letter sent to the Chief of the Charlotte Police Department,
Mr. Yurko requested that the officers investigating the Smith and Ray
murders be given the information that defendant did not want to be
questioned without an attorney present. Apparently this was not done
since Officer Styron testified he had no actual knowledge of defendant's
invocation of his right to silence.
308 N.C. at 695, n.1, 304 S.E.2d at 587, n.1 (Exum, J. dissenting).
23. Franklin was in the county jail on charges unrelated to the case sub
judice. "He was charged with rape, kidnapping and robbery and apparently con-
fessed to those crimes." Id. at 685, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
24. Brief for Appellant at 9, n.8, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983).
25. 308 N.C. at 684, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
26. Record at 18, Franklin (Order on Motion to Suppress). The trial judge
found the following as a matter of law:
1. The defendant volunteered the initial information concerning the in-
stant offenses to officers who had not in any way mentioned to him or
questioned him about them, and the defendant requested the interview
at which he did so.
2. The defendant at all times he was being questioned by the police fully
understood his Constitutional rights to remain silent, his right to coun-
sel, and the other rights guaranteed him under Miranda v. Arizona.
[Vol. 7:51
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sexual offense and first degree felony murder.17 Franklin was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment.28 The Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina affirmed. 9
BACKGROUND
A. The Right to Counsel
Miranda v. Arizona created the right to counsel warning0 as
a prophylactic rule 1 designed to protect an individual's fifth
amendment right against compelled self incrimination.2 The
Court found "that without proper safeguards the process of in-cus-
tody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime con-
tains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
3. The defendant fully understanding these rights freely, knowingly, in-
telligently and voluntarily waived each of them upon each of the occa-
sions referred to above and made the statements offered in evidence of
his own free will without any threats, inducements or promises, and
without coercion of any sort.
Record at 22, Franklin (Order on Motion to Suppress).
27. 308 N.C. at 683, 304 S.E.2d at 580. Franklin was primarily convicted on
the weight of his confession. Confessions must be corroborated by other evidence.
A conviction cannot stand solely on the uncorroborated confession of one accused
of the crime. See State v. Thompson, 287 N.C. 303, 214 S.E.2d 742 (1975). In the
case sub judice one of the questions on appeal concerned the sufficiency of evi-
dence presented which convicted Franklin. Franklin was sentenced to life impris-
onment for the offense of first degree felony murder. The felony which acted as
the basis for the felony murder conviction was the first degree sexual offense.
There was no evidence offered which supported this offense save for Franklin's
confession. The Court held, with no dissents, "that independent proof of the un-
derlying felony in a felony murder prosecution is not necessary where a confes-
sion, otherwise corroborated as to the murder, includes sufficient facts to support
the existence of the felony." 308 N.C. at 693-94, 304 S.E.2d at 586.
28. 308 N.C. at 683, 304 S.E.2d at 580.
29. Id. at 694, 304 S.E.2d at 586. No error found.
30. 384 U.S. at 471. This note will not include an in-depth look at the Mi-
randa decision since it is the writer's view that the proliferation of material con-
cerning this landmark case leaves the reader with more alternatives than can real-
istically be considered. Miranda is used here merely to point out a few of the
more important considerations the Court had in mind when it created the "right
to counsel" requisite.
31. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974).
32. See supra note 4.
1984]
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would not otherwise do so freely."33 The safeguards require that an
individual in an in-custody setting be informed of his constitu-
tional rights and that the invocation of such rights be fully
honored.14 The relevant inquiry, then, is whether an individual has
been subjected to a custodial interrogation and has had his consti-
tutional rights fully honored. The Court defined custodial interro-
gation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." '3 5
B. Custodial Interrogation
In Rhode Island v. Innis,36 the Supreme Court clarified what
it meant by "interrogation." The issue presented was whether In-
nis was "interrogated" in violation of the standards promulgated in
the Miranda decision.37 Innis, a suspect in the shooting death of a
Providence, Rhode Island taxi cab driver, was arrested and in-
formed of his Miranda rights.38 He responded that he understood
his rights and wished to consult with an attorney. 9 The three of-
ficers assigned to take Innis downtown were instructed not to ques-
tion, intimidate or coerce him in any way. 0
On the way downtown, two of the officers began a conversation
between themselves in the presence of Innis.4'1 The officers ex-
pressed their desire that the search for the shotgun continue until
the gun was found. The officers wanted to find the gun quickly
because a school for handicapped children was located in the vicin-
ity. They hoped that a "little girl" would not find the gun first and
hurt herself.4 2 After hearing this conversation, Innis told the of-
33. 384 U.S. at 467.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 444.
36. 446 U.S. 291.
37. Id. at 298.
38. Id. at 293-94.
39. Id. at 294.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 294-95. The testimony given by the patrolman in question revealed
that the conversation included the following:
[Patrolman Gleckman]:
A. At this point I was talking back and forth with Patrolman McKenna
stating that I frequent this area while on patrol and [that because a
school for handicapped children is located nearby,] there's a lot of handi-
capped children running around in this area and god forbid one of them
[Vol. 7:51
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ficers where the gun was hidden.4
It is debatable whether the officers in question were merely
expressing their heartfelt concern for the safety of a "little girl" or
whether their conversation was designed to elicit a confession from
Innis-the result of the conversation regardless of the motive. Nev-
ertheless, the trial judge "found that it was understandable that
the officers would express their concern for the safety of the handi-
capped children. ' 44 The judge held that Innis' decision to tell the
police the location of the gun was "a waiver, clearly, and on the
basis of the evidence that I have heard, and [sic] intelligent waiver,
of his [Miranda] right to remain silent."45 The judge did not de-
cide whether Innis had been interrogated. 8
Justice Stewart delivered the Court's definition of interroga-
tion: "references . . . to 'questioning' [throughout the Miranda
opinion] might suggest that the Miranda rules were meant to ap-
ply only to those police interrogation practices that involve express
questioning of a defendant while in custody. We do not, however,
construe the Miranda opinion so narrowly. '47 Justice Stewart went
on to say that interrogation included not only express questioning
but also included words and actions by police which the police
should know were "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse from the suspect. 48
Turning to the facts of the case, Justice Stewart concluded
that Innis was not interrogated since there was no express ques-
tioning of Innis and he was not invited to respond.49 In addition
the conversation was not the "functional equivalent" of question-
ing since the officers could not reasonably have known that their
might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.
[Patrolman McKenna]:
A. I more or less concurred with him [Gleckman] that it was a safety
factor and that we should, you know, continue the search for the weapon
and try to find it.
[Patrolman Williams, not involved in the conversation]:
A. He [Gleckman] said it would be too bad if the little-I believe he said
girl-would pick up the gun, [and] maybe kill herself.
446 U.S. 294-95.
43. Id. at 295.
44. Id. at 296.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 298-99.
48. Id. at 301.
49. Id. at 302.
19841
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conversation would elicit an incriminating response from Innis. 50
C. Reinterrogation
In Michigan v. Mosley,51 the Court again interpreted what it
had meant in Miranda.52 The question the Court faced in Mosley
was whether law enforcement officers could reinterrogate one in
custody, after that individual had invoked his right to silence.
Mosley was arrested for robbing the Blue Goose Bar and the White
Tower Restaurant. After Detective Cowie finished the arrest pa-
pers and informed Mosley of his Miranda rights the interrogation
began. Questioning soon ceased when Mosley indicated that he did
not wish to answer any questions concerning the robberies. Mosley
was then taken to a cell. The arrest was effected in the early after-
noon and the questioning took approximately twenty minutes."
Shortly after six o'clock, p.m., Detective Hill with the Homi-
cide Bureau questioned Mosley" about the death of a man shot
during a hold-up attempt.56 Mosley was not under arrest for this
charge nor was he interrogated about it by Cowie. Mosley was read
his Miranda rights. Mosley first denied any involvement, but
finally implicated himself in the homicide.57
The Mosley Court pointed out that the Miranda decision set
out a per se rule "that unless law enforcement officers give speci-
fied warnings before questioning a person in custody, and follow
50. Id.
51. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
52. Id. at 99.
53. Id. at 98-99. Although this note deals specifically with the situation where
an accused has evidenced his desire to deal with the police only with counsel pre-
sent and the Court in Mosley concerned itself with the situation where an accused
has invoked his right to silence, analysis of the case will prove helpful in under-
standing Edwards and how the North Carolina Supreme Court deviated from its
clear mandate. It is important to note that the Court has held the right to counsel
to be more important than the right to silence and therefore requires more pro-
tection, see infra text accompanying notes 85-90.
54. Id. at 97.
55. Id. at 97-98. This interrogation occurred in the same building as Mosley
was being kept.
56. Id. at 98.
57. Id. The trial court allowed Mosley's admission into evidence. Mosley was
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The appel-
late court reversed the judgment of conviction holding that Detective Hill's inter-
rogation of Mosley had been a per se violation of. Miranda doctrine. The State,
then, filed petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
[Vol. 7:51
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certain specified procedures during the course of any subsequent
interrogation, any statement made by the person in custody cannot
over his objection be admitted in evidence against him as a defen-
dant at trial .... "5 This prohibition is applicable even though
the statement is wholly voluntary.59 The Miranda rule states that
anytime the privilege to remain silent is invoked questioning must
cease. However, the rule "does not state under what circumstances,
if any, a resumption of questioning is permissible."' o0
The Court in Mosley felt that a literal interpretation of the
Miranda "cessation" passage could have one of at least three
meanings. First, the passage could mean that a person invoking his
right to silence could never again be questioned while in custody
by any law enforcement officer on any subject at any time or place.
The second possible meaning is that any statement would be inad-
missible as the product of compulsion. And the third possibility is
that once the right to silence is invoked, questioning is required to
cease immediately and then is permitted to resume only after a
momentary respite."
The Court viewed each of these literal interpretations as tend-
ing to "lead to absurd and unintended results."62 On the one hand,
Miranda's purpose would be frustrated if it were read to allow a
"continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary cessa-
tion . . .. "6 On the other hand, "a blanket prohibition against the
taking of voluntary statements. . . would transform the Miranda
safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police in-
vestigative activity . ". ..  Therefore, the Court interpreted the
Miranda opinion as not creating a proscription of indefinite dura-
tion upon questioning once the right to remain silent has been
invoked.5
The facts show that Mosley had invoked his right to remain
silent with regard to the robberies,66 but that he had not invoked
his right to silence with regard to the murder for which he subse-
58. Id. at 99-100.
59. Id. at 100.
60. Id. at 101.
61. Id. at 102.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 102-03.
66. Id. at 104.
19841
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quently incriminated himself.6 7 The facts also reveal that Mosley's
wish to remain silent was honored68 and that the "second" interro-
gation was really the "first" interrogation concerning the homi-
cide.8 9 This was not a case, therefore, where "the police failed to
honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, ei-
ther by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or
by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and
make him change his mind. '70 As a result, the Court held that ad-
mission of Mosley's incriminating statement was not a violation of
the Miranda principles. 1
D. The Edwards Rule
The Innis definition of "interrogation 7 2 is of particular im-
portance when considered in light of the Supreme Court's holding
in Edwards v. Arizona.' Edwards was arrested on charges of rob-
bery, burglary and first-degree murder. 4 Upon being informed of
his Miranda rights, Edwards requested counsel. 5 The next day
Edwards was told that he had to talk, and, as a result, he impli-
cated himself in the offenses charged.' 6 The Arizona Supreme
Court found that Edwards had invoked his right to counsel during
the first interrogation but had waived his right to counsel during
the second interrogation. The United States Supreme Court
reversed.7
The Supreme Court had two reasons for reversing the Arizona
Court. The Court first determined that an erroneous standard for
determining waiver of the right to counsel was applied.78 The
Court pointed out that a waiver "of counsel must not only be vol-
untary, but also must constitute a knowing and intelligent relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. '79 This
67. Id. at 105.
68. Id. at 104.
69. Id. at 105.
70. Id. at 105-06.
71. Id. at 107.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
73. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
74. Id. at 478.
75. Id. at 479.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 480.
78. Id. at 482.
79. Id.
[Vol. 7:51
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is a standard that the Court has reiterated and clarified in many
decisions. 80
The trial court found Edward's confession to be voluntarily
made without separately focusing on whether Edwards had know-
ingly and intelligently relinquished his right to counsel.81 The Su-
preme Court did not question the soundness of the trial court find-
ing of "voluntariness" regarding Edward's confession. 82 However,
the Court realized that "neither the trial court nor the State Su-
preme Court undertook to focus on whether Edwards understood
his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished
it."" The Court gave as its first reason for reversal the fact that
neither the trial court nor the supreme court understood the re-
quirements for finding a valid waiver of an invoked right to
counsel."
The Court's second reason for reversing the Arizona Supreme
Court was based on the importance attached to the assertion by
one in custody of his right to counsel. When one accused of a crime
asks for counsel, additional safeguards are required.85 Miranda
"distinguished between the procedural safeguards triggered by a
request to remain silent and a request for an attorney." '8 After in-
voking his Miranda right to counsel an accused has the undisputed
right to remain silent and to be free from interrogation until he
has consulted with an attorney.87 The Court "reconfirm[ed] these
views and emphasize[d] that it is inconsistent with Miranda and
its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate
an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to coun-
sel."" Therefore, the Court held that simply following the stan-
dard of showing a valid waiver of the right to counsel was insuffi-
cient to allow an admission thus obtained into evidence.8 9 The
Court then held "that an accused, such as Edwards, having ex-
80. Id. at 482-83, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); See Fare
v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,
374-75 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
81. 451 U.S. at 483.
82. Id. at 484.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 451 U.S. at 484, citing 441 U.S. 369, 372-76.
86. 451 U.S. at 485, citing 423 U.S. at 104.
87. 451 U.S. at 485, citing 446 U.S. at 298.
88. 451 U.S. at 485.
89. Id. at 484.
1984]
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pressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is
not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel
has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initi-
ates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police."90 This is the substance of the Edwards rule.
The majority held that the "fruits" 1 of Edward's second in-
terrogation were not admissible into evidence. 2 Further, the Court
pointed out that Edwards could have waived his right to counsel.93
In order to determine whether one has validly waived his right to
counsel, the question would be "whether the purported waiver was
knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of
the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused,
not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities."9 " In
other words, that the defendant initiated the dialogue.
Justice Powell concurred with the majority in result but did
not join in the reasoning because he was not sure what the major-
ity's opinion meant.9 5 Justice Powell agreed with the majority's
first reason for reversal, i.e. that the Arizona Supreme Court did
not apply the correct standard in determining whether Edwards
validly waived his right to counsel.96 Justice Powell's problem with
the majority's opinion was with the second reason. He found the
Court's opinion to be unclear in explaining what it meant by
"initiation."97
Justice Powell stated that he could not agree with the opinion
"if read to create a new per se rule, requiring a threshold inquiry
as to precisely who opened up any conversation between an ac-
cused and state officials." 98 Thus, Justice Powell's hesitation to
join the Court's opinion centered upon what he felt to be too much
emphasis on one element - initiation.
In Oregon v. Bradshaw,99 eight Justices agreed that "initia-
90. Id. at 484-85.
91. Id. at 485; See, also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (discussion of
the concept of the "fruit of the first confession" and when evidence obtained im-
permissibly is to be excluded from evidence at criminal trials); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
92. 451 U.S. at 487.
93. Id. at 486.
94. Id. at 486, n.9 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 488.
96. Id. at 489.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 489-91.
99. -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 2830 (1983). The Court, however, remained divided on
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tion" is the one element which should be emphasized. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, found that the defendant, by
asking "Well, what is going to happen to me now?,"1 0 initiated
dialogue with the authorities. The dissenting opinion, written by
Justice Marshall,10' was directed toward defining what Bradshaw
intended by the query. Justice Marshall felt that under the cir-
cumstances, the question only evidenced Bradshaw's desire to find
out where the police were going to take him.10 2 However, as Justice
Powell pointed out, both Justices Rehnquist and Marshall agreed
in one respect - the initiation question is the first step in a two-
step analysis. 0 3
ANALYSIS
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Franklin,104
found no violation of the defendant's fifth amendment right to be
free from police initiated interrogation after the defendant invoked
his right to counsel. 0 5 Specifically, the majority found that Frank-
lin had not invoked his right to counsel with regard to the murder
to which he confessed and therefore Edwards did not control.1°e
The court, then found from the totality of the circumstances that
Franklin validly waived his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel. In short, the court found that all that remained was
Franklin's "completely unsolicited confession to a murder about
which there had never been any intention to question.' 0 7
The majority found that Officer Styron's purpose in interview-
ing Franklin was to renew efforts to question the defendant con-
cerning the Smith and Ray murders. 0 8 Officer Styron testified, at
the voir dire hearing on the motion to suppress the confession,
that he did not know that Franklin had invoked his right to coun-
what it meant by "initiation."
100. Id. at -, 103 S.Ct. 2835.
101. -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. at 2838. Justice Rehnquist was joined in his opinion
by Chief Justice Burger, Justice White and Justice O'Connor. Justice Marshall
was joined in his dissent by Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun and Justice Ste-
vens. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion.
102. -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. at 2840.
103. Id. at -, 103 S.Ct. 2835, 2840; See supra note 7.
104. 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983).
105. Id. at 685-86, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
106. Id. at 686, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
107. Id. at 687, 304 S.E.2d at 582-83.
108. Id. at 685, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
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sel with respect to the Smith and Ray murders."" The court found
that Officer Styron "began the conversation on a sympathetic note,
acknowledging defendant's 'predicament' arising out of the rape/
robbery arrest, 1 ° his problems with sexual violations involving
young children, and his need for psychological treatment.""' Then,
the court found, the defendant requested to be taken downtown
before any mention was made of the purpose for which Officer
Styron visited Franklin, i.e., the Smith and Ray murders. In re-
sponse to Officer Styron's question: "Do you want to talk about
these cases?" Franklin replied that he did. Once downtown, Frank-
lin was asked what he wanted to talk about. In response, Franklin
began discussing the Michelle Moody murder, not the Smith and
Ray murders.""
The rationale for the court's opinion begins with the fact that
the court determined that Franklin never invoked his right to
counsel with regard to the Michelle Moody murder.11 3 The court
then noted that the defendant was duly warned of his Miranda
rights before any questioning began. " The court, looking at the
totality of the circumstances, determined that no significance
should be given to the fact that the Miranda warning was not ex-
panded upon or explained, or that the defendant was questioned in
a small, windowless interrogation.' " In short, the court felt "the
defendant simply waived his rights and chose to cooperate with the
law enforcement authorities.""1 The court concluded by recalling
Chief Justice Warren's words in Miranda that "confessions remain
a proper element in law enforcement,"' 7 and holding "that under
the facts of this case, defendant's confessions were voluntarily and
understandingly made after he had been fully advised of his con-
stitutional rights and had specifically, knowingly, and intelligently
waived his right to remain silent and to have counsel present dur-
ing questioning."" 8
109. Id. at 685-86, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
110. Id. at 686, 304 S.E.2d at 582. Apparently, Franklin confessed to these
other offenses the day prior to Officer Styron's interview with him. Id. at 685.
111. Id. at 686, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 685, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
115. Id. at 687, 304 S.E.2d at 582-83.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 687, 304 S.E.2d at 583, citing 384 U.S. at 478.
118. 308 N.C. at 687, 304 S.E.2d at 583.
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The majority did not decide one issue which was (and still is)
of paramount importance in the correct determination of this case:
"We do not decide whether Officers Styron and Price, in good
faith, might properly have initiated questioning concerning the
Ray and Smith murders in light of defendant's earlier request that
he have an attorney present during questioning on these cases." 119
Justice Exum in his dissent felt that this was the proper question
to answer and that the majority determined the wrong question
when it decided that the defendant had at no time invoked his
right to counsel with regard to Moody. 120
Justice Exum believed that the Supreme Court's holding in
Edwards "compels the conclusion that Officers Styron and Price
could not have properly initiated questioning about the Smith and
Ray murders, as they did, in light of defendant's express request
that an attorney be present during any further questioning about
those murders." '21 The basis for this belief is that since Officer
Styron visited Franklin in the first place, for the purpose of ques-
tioning Franklin about the Ray and Smith murders, and that a
confession by Franklin concerning those murders would be inad-
missible under Edwards, then the fact that Franklin confessed to
another murder did not change the character of Officer Styron's
initial contact with Franklin. Therefore, Franklin's confession
should have been found to be inadmissible. In other words, since
Styron's initial contact with Franklin was impermissible, the fruit
of such contact was also inadmissible. 122 It seems, then, that
Franklin's constitutional right to be free from a police initiated in-
terrogation was violated.
The majority's opinion leads the reader of State v. Franklin to
believe that Officer Styron never mentioned to Franklin that he
wished to talk with Franklin about the Smith and Ray murders.
Yet, the court noted that Officer Styron's purpose in questioning
Franklin was to question him about the Smith and Ray murders.
The court then held that "[p]rior to any discussion, defendant
waived his constitutional rights and indicated he would answer
questions without the presence of an attorney. 1 23 Then the court
found that Franklin asked to be taken downtown to "talk about
119. Id. at 686-87, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
120. Id. at 699, 304 S.E.2d at 590 (Exum, J. dissenting).
121. Id. at 699-700, 304 S.E.2d at 589 (Exum, J. dissenting).
122. Id. at 700, 304 S.E.2d 590 (Exum, J. dissenting).
123. Id. at 685, 304 S.E.2d at 582 (emphasis added).
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these cases" before any mention of the Ray and Smith cases was
made to him.""
An excerpt from the voir dire hearing on the motion to sup-
press the confession is helpful in understanding how the majority's
opinion misleads the reader:
The Court: What did you advise [Franklin]?
[Officer Styron]: Your Honor, I have a card that I was reading to
him. OK, I informed him that I wanted to talk about the Nealy
Smith and Amanda Ray case, and I informed him [of his Mi-
randa rights]. After I read these rights to Him, then I asked him
"Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to
you?" He said "Yes." "Having these rights in mind, do you now
wish to answer questions?" He said "Yes." "And do you now wish
to answer questions without a lawyer present?" He said "Yes." At
that point we started carrying on a conversation. 2"
The transcript reveals that one of the very first things that Officer
Styron told Franklin was that he intended to interrogate Franklin
about the Smith and Ray murders. 126 Yet, despite this clear record,
the court found that no mention of the Ray or Smith murders was
made to Franklin by Officer Styron.
Officer Styron's visit to and conversation with Franklin consti-
tuted interrogation. The majority stated that Officer Styron "be-
gan the conversation on a sympathetic note, acknowledging defen-
dant's 'predicament' . . . his problems with sexual violations with
young children and his need for psychological treatment.' ' 1 7 Of-
ficer Styron asked Franklin whether he had ever received any
treatment for his problem while he was serving time. Franklin re-
plied that he had not. 2 8 This dialogue is clearly interrogation
under the Innis definition. Innis included in its definition "any
words or actions on the part of police ...that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect.129 The Innis Court found that psychological ploys
used as techniques of persuasion in a custodial setting amount to
interrogation.3 0
124. Id. at 686, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
125. Brief for Appellant, at App-3, State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 304
S.E.2d 779 (1983).
126. 308 N.C. at 686, 304 S.E.2d at 582 (emphasis added).
127. Id.
128. Brief for Appellant, at App-4, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983).
129. See supra text accompanying note 48.
130. 446 U.S. at 299.
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Officer Styron's avowed purpose in seeing Franklin was to get
a confession concerning the Smith and Ray murders. This is what
he thought he was getting in response to the question, "What do
you want to talk about?" Instead Styron received a confession
about Michelle Moody's murder." " Surely the majority is not ask-
ing the reader to believe that a confession by Franklin about the
Smith and Ray murders would not have been the direct result of
Officer Styron's interrogation. Why then, is the reader asked to be-
lieve that Franklin's confession was not the direct result of that
same interrogation?
Edwards as a per se rule requires the first step in any analysis
to determine whether one's right to counsel, previously invoked,
has been validly waived, to be a determination of who initiated the
conversation. "' If the accused initiated that conversation, then the
court must, based on the totality of the circumstances, determine
whether such a waiver was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
made. 33 However, if the accused did not initiate the conversation,
then any evidence obtained from the conversation is inadmissible
as "fruit" from an impermissible interrogation. 3'
Since Franklin gave an incriminating response, as a result of
police interrogation about a crime for which he had previously in-
voked his right to counsel, the proper question for the court to an-
swer is whether Officer Styron initiated the communication, ex-
change or conversation or whether Franklin initiated such
communication, exchange or conversation. The majority's opinion
shows that Officer Styron initiated the conversation with Franklin
which led to the confession.' s He went to question Franklin, he
read Franklin the Miranda rights, and he even "began the conver-
sation" which constituted interrogation.136 Further, the voir dire
transcript shows that Officer Styron visited on his own accord and
without invitation from Franklin.13 7
However the majority in Franklin viewed defendant's waiver
as valid based solely on the totality of the circumstances.3 88 The
Court did not determine whether Officer Styron was permissibly
131. 308 N.C. at 685, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
132. See supra note 7; See supra text accompanying note 103.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 77-90.
134. Id.
135. 308 N.C. at 685, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
136. Id. at 685-86, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
137. Brief for Appellant, at App-15, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983).
138. 308 N.C. at 687, 304 S.E.2d at 583.
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interrogating Franklin. The court merely held that Franklin had
not invoked his right to counsel with regard to the Michelle Moody
murder and so the first step of the Edwards analysis was not
necessary.3 9
The most believable theory upon which the court's actions can
rest is that of "dual conversations." Presumably there are two sep-
arate and distinct conversations. The first beginning when Officer
Styron initiated the conversation with Franklin about his "predica-
ment" and ending, presumably, when Franklin asked Styron to
take him downtown. Franklin's request to be taken downtown was
Franklin's initiation of the second interrogation-that was con-
ducted downtown and resulted in Franklin's confession to the mur-
der of Michelle Moody. Since Franklin asked to be taken down-
town not in response to a direct question by Officer Styron, this is
a viable theory if Franklin's question is seen as ending one conver-
sation and beginning a totally new one.
The problem with this interpretation, however, is that under
Edwards' two step analysis the proper determination is whether
the accused initiated the dialogue. The determinative word is "ini-
tiation." Who initiated the conversation? In Franklin's case the
answer is that Officer Styron initiated the conversation. This is
true even if there was a second conversation since it was his inter-
rogation of the defendant, impermissible under Edwards, which
led to defendant's request to be taken downtown.
In Michigan v. Mosley the Supreme Court felt that one of Mi-
randa's literal interpretations would allow the police to immedi-
ately follow an interrogation which had been stopped by an ac-
cused with "another" interrogation.1 4 0 The Court felt that such an
interpretation would lead to absurd results, and would act to un-
dermine the purpose of Miranda."' The Court, therefore, consid-
ered a possible "dual conversation" theory with respect to the right
to remain silent and found it not to be in accord with the purposes
of Miranda."24 Consequently, a "dual conversation" alternative
should not be allowed when dealing with the more important right
to counsel." 3' To allow the court to interpret a conversation into
two separate conversations whenever the accused asks a question
139. Id. at 686, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
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pursuant to an impermissible interrogation would allow the Ed-
ward's per se rule to be undermined.
As Justice Exum pointed out in his dissent, the court should
have inquired into the issue of "whether Officers Styron and Price,
in good faith, might properly have initiated questioning concerning
the Ray and Smith murders, in light of defendant's earlier request
that he have an attorney present during questioning on these cases
.... Edwards is a per se rule145 with no "good faith" excep-
tion. It is either met or it is not. As Justice Exum pointed out in
his dissent, "it is clear that the officers [in Edwards] had no actual
knowledge [that Edwards] had invoked his right to counsel . . .
,,i Since the officers in Edwards indicated good faith and the
Court decided Edwards the way it did, there is no good faith ex-
ception to the rule.
CONCLUSION
In State v. Franklin, the majority's opinion is ambiguous in its
application of Edwards' proscription. It is ambiguous because on
the one hand, the majority acknowledges the Edwards rule while
on the other hand, it disregards the rule when it applies the law to
the facts of the case."17 In the majority's application, the rule is not
controlling since Franklin had never invoked his right to counsel
with respect to the murder to which he confessed. 148 The court dis-
regards the fact that Officer Styron was impermissibly interrogat-
ing Franklin in the first place. Considering the majority's neglect
of the key issue: whether Officer Styron could initiate questioning
regarding the Smith and Ray murders without violating the Ed-
wards rule, the rationale for the court's opinion is inherently sus-
pect. Edwards should control the conversation which resulted from
Officer Styron's initiated interview. The result of this impermissi-
ble contact was properly excludable from evidence."19
The dissent is the more sound of the two opinions. Justice
Exum relies on the Edwards rule to conclude that the confession
was tainted and therefore it should have been excluded. It is also
144. 308 N.C. at 686-87, 304 S.E. 2d at 582.
145. See supra notes 7, 135; See supra text accompanying note 103.
146. 308 N.C. at 701, n.4, 304 S.E.2d at 591 (Exum, J. dissenting); citing 451
U.S. at 478, n.1.
147. 308 N.C. at 686, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 700, 304 S.E.2d at 590 (Exum, J. dissenting).
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the more logically reasoned of the two opinions. The rationale for
the dissenting opinion lies in the thought that if Officer Styron had
not initiated the interview with Franklin, then Franklin could not
have asked Styron to take him downtown' 50 and Franklin would
not, at that time, have confessed to the killing of Michelle
Moody. 1'
Innis defined "interrogation" as a conversation which a police
officer reasonably should know will elicit an incriminating state-
ment from one in custody. 52 Officer Styron interviewed Franklin
to elicit a confession regarding the Smith and Ray murders. This
was Styron's purpose and the first thing he informed Franklin of
before reading him his rights.15 Franklin had earlier expressed his
desire for counsel's presence if and when he was again interrogated
about the Smith and Ray murders.' 5 ' Edwards has been inter-
preted as a per se rule'55 prohibiting police-initiated interrogation
in such circumstances. 15 Information obtained by the authorities
in violation of Edwards prohibition is evidence which should be
excluded at trial. Justice Exum was, therefore, correct in his dis-
sent that Franklin's fifth and fourteenth amendment right against
compelled self-incrimination was violated.
The United States Supreme Court decisions following the Mi-
randa opinion regarding an accused's right to counsel make it clear
that Officer Styron's interview with Franklin was a violation of
150. Id.
151. Franklin may at some other point in time have confessed on his own
initiative, but the purpose of this note is not to hazard a guess at what may have
been but rather what should have been.
152. 446 U.S. at 299.
153. 308 N.C. at 685, 304 S.E.2d at 582.
154. See supra note 22.
155. There is some question as to whether Franklin was charged for the
Smith and Ray murders the first time Styron questioned him in March or April of
1981. Styron testified that Franklin was not charged at that time but rather was
"invited to come down to [be] interviewed." Brief for Appellant at App-2, 308
N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983). This is not a serious question since Franklin was
clearly in custody when Styron questioned him the second time. The only ques-
tion, then, is whether one can invoke his right to counsel before he is interrogated
in custody, i.e., since Franklin's first interview with Styron may not have been an
"in custody" interrogation within the meaning of Miranda and Innis, see Oregon
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), could Franklin invoke his rights prior to the
second interview? The answer is revealed in the text of Miranda: "An individual
need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such a request af-
firmatively secures his right to have one." 384 U.S. at 470.
156. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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Franklin's constitutionally protected right to counsel. The North
Carolina Supreme Court should at the earliest possible moment ac-
knowledge the error of its holding in State v. Franklin, and thus
come into accord with the per se rule of Edwards v. Arizona.
John Lloyd Coble
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